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SepSecIntelligence
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The Geopolitics of an Independent Quebec
by Dee Sparling
Copyright © 2000
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
The recent Clarity Act passed by the Canadian government supports the notion that an independent Quebec must be separate in all respects. Gone is the concept of "sovereignty-association," first proposed in the 1970s by the Parti Quebecois under Rene Levesque, which called for political sovereignty while allowing for continued participation in the Canadian economic apparatus. The message now is that Canada will not tolerate a partial separation. If Quebec opts for separation, it will depend entirely upon itself for survival.
The reasoning behind the Clarity Act is that the rules and profound implications of separation need to be defined and appreciated beforehand in order to avoid monumental acrimony and confusion in the event that a successful separatist referendum is followed by a unilateral declaration of independence. The professed intention, at least, is admirable. However, the notion of disallowing a special economic status and forcing Quebec to go it alone is essentially a scare tactic which could backfire for Canada if separation ever occurs.
In a scenario where Canada has slammed the door on a fledgling Quebecois republic instead of acting as a partner or mentor, Quebec's stability could be undermined considerably, thereby increasing the likelihood of radicalism on both sides of the schism. Once radicalism emerged, so would the potential for third-party interventionism. And this is precisely where the Canadian government has been shortsighted and introverted, apparently unable or unwilling to appreciate the geopolitical scope of the issue. By guaranteeing that Quebec's independence would be total, the Clarity Act undermines Canada's own ability to influence post-separaton realities in any capacity beyond that of a foreign nation. The Chretien government believed it was drafting domestic policy; in fact, it has made a needless foreign-policy decision prior to the existence of relevant circumstances. In order to sell a bluff, Canada's government has weakened seriously Canada's bargaining position in the event of an actual separation.
The importance of Canada's relationship with a post-separation Quebec quickly crystallizes with a look at the potential geopolitical implications of a completely independent Quebec. What becomes apparent is that more than two destinies are at issue: As surely as the tone established by the federal government influences the likely nature of an independent Quebec, a hostile or unstable Quebec would invite concern from powers larger than the original players. This would work not only against Quebec's interests, but Canada's.
Quebec's first priority as an independent state would be a three-pronged foreign policy initiative aimed at enhancing its ongoing cultural flirtation with France, redefining its political and economic relationship with Canada, and renewing its interactions with the United States. And these three countries will themselves be very attentive to the emerging character of the new republic, but for considerably different reasons.
Ironically, challenges to Quebec's cultural sovereignty would increase, not decrease, with national independence. Leaving Canada would mean leaving a federal structure which has encouraged (and even legislated) the means for ensuring considerable Quebecois influence across half a continent, while also offering French-Canadians considerable cultural autonomy within Quebec's borders. For this reason alone, an independent Quebec would have less political and cultural influence in North America than it enjoyed as a Canadian province. Protecting itself from American cultural influence would become even more difficult without the buffer formerly provided by Canada's cultural protectionism and related bureaucracies.
There is little doubt, therefore, that a Quebecois republic would attempt to solidify its cultural identity and international prestige by increasing its interaction on all levels with France. Such overtures would almost certainly be welcomed. In symbiotic fashion, France is Quebec's door to the world stage, while Quebec independence would feed France's preoccupation with challenging the global reach of Anglo-American culture. Both have been fighting a similar battle for some time now, feeling besieged by Anglo-American culture on their own respective levels. Quebec would elevate its national mission and prestige by tying in with France, while France would view Quebec independence as a sign that cultural tides are turning. As far back as the 1960s and de Gaulle's cry of "Vivre le Quebec libre!," France was openly abetting Quebec separatism. While French destiny clearly is not tied to an independent Quebec, the return of a long-lost sister-nation to the world stage would most certainly be hailed in Paris as a cultural renaissance bearing untold possibilities for French prestige globally.
Whether or not this mutuality of cultural interests would augment economic ties is a complex issue influenced by French involvement in the European Union and ongoing Quebecois ties to North American economies. But even if genuine efforts were made to enhance the economic relationship, such ties likely would remain peripheral to the real and urgent political and cultural goals.
In courting French political and cultural support, however, it is conceivable that Quebec would pay a price by becoming a pawn in the ongoing frictions between U.S. and French foreign policies. France has long been resentful of American influence in Western Europe. If historical sentimentality plays any role in political affairs -- and clearly it does -- would France pass up such a golden opportunity to extend its own influence into North America, particularly in the name of mentoring a long-lost sister? What level of involvement would France willingly venture? And what level would Quebec tolerate? More to the point, what would the United States tolerate?
Acceptance within the North American community is, of course, pivotal to Quebec's viability as an independent state. However, it would not be offered cheaply, and almost certainly would not be on Quebec's terms:
At 133 years, the Canadian federal state is one of the oldest political structures in today's world, and, thus far, one of its most successful when measured against virtually any criteria -- standard of living, economic performance, healthcare and social security, global respect and partnerships, and even military history. Quebec independence, justified or otherwise, would severely injure one of the most successful nation-states in recent human history. The prospects for constructive economic, strategic, and territorial restructuring between Canada and Quebec would be complicated by the psychology of resentment. Against difficult issues such as defining new borders, the shared burden of national debt, minority rights within Quebec, dispersal of military assets, and access to the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Maritimes, there likely would be a simmering tendency toward radicalism in both camps.
Like Quebec, Canada would face the question of its very survival. Any credible semblance of economic and cultural independence from the United States would depend upon its continuing viability as a member of the Atlantic community, which in turn would centre upon Central Canada's access to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Maritimes, and ultimately Europe. An ultra-nationalist, sovereign Quebec, could threaten this seriously, thus increasing the chances of radical action on the part of the Canadian government.
Quebec independence would be the ultimate test of the elusive Canadian identity in what remains of Canada, raising issues and challenges which would require hard decisions: Would Quebec's departure inspire a patriotic "rally around the flag" or provoke further regional disintegration? What is the viability equation for Ontario as an independent nation? Or perhaps British Columbia? With Western provinces suddenly endowed with proportionally greater economic, political, and cultural sway within this new Canada, would Ottawa continue to be a culturally (and strategically) viable location for Parliament? Would identification with the new Canadian reality not require the gesture of moving the seat of government westward, perhaps to Winnipeg or Saskatoon? How would this affect Maritime sensibilities?
While U.S. foreign policy is often portrayed as sluggish in the face of new challenges, the sophistication of American statesmanship has been undeniable in the face of Quebec separatism. This is no accident. While outwardly optimistic, there can be little doubt that policymakers in Washington would view an independent Quebec as a major security concern for the United States. Canada's invaluable contribution to U.S. security has been its sheer stability and solid friendship, something which vast armies and military hardware simply cannot buy. The strength of "Fortress North America" historically has resided in its predictability and hence suitability as America's base for projecting power globally, thus ensuring that the mainland U.S. remains untouchable by conventional military means. American power today derives as much from the historical absence of powerful, aggressive neighbours as it does from the domestic ability to organize itself politically, economically and militarily. Recognition of this advantage came early in U.S. history when President Monroe enunciated what became known as the Monroe Doctrine, which effectively declared the Western Hemisphere off-limits to European military adventurism.
In separating from Canada, Quebec would be introducing significant instability to North America in numerous ways. First, the United States (and Canada for that matter) suddenly would have a new, unpredictable, and openly nationalistic neighbour which straddles one of the world's most strategic waterways. Second, Quebec's independence would threaten the continuing stability of Canada, which from the U.S. perspective has been a long-time neighbour in good standing. Third, the almost inevitable courtship and reciprocation between the Quebecois and French republics could raise American suspicions about French strategic intentions in an increasingly multi-polar world. Fourth, Quebec's place in the military fabric of North America would need negotiation, a project which could be hindered by the extent, real or perceived, of Quebecois-French geopolitical collaboration and Quebecois-Canadian friction. Fifth, Quebec's place in the economic fabric of North America could be handicapped in the event of its refusal to accept a proportional share of the Canadian fiscal debt. Sixth, economic, political, and military negotiations between Canada, Quebec and the U.S. could create tensions which damage the once-predictable relationship between Canada and the U.S. in a manner which would have been unthinkable prior to Quebec's independence.
Finally, in the worst-case scenario of a military confrontation between Canada and Quebec, U.S. forces would be placed on high-alert and plans for a potential intervention would be drafted. With neither Canada nor Quebec possessing sufficient military muscle for a decisive victory, the conflict would likely be long and drawn out -- a messy, low-intensity affair fought along a world-trade corridor essential to the economies of eight heavily-populated American states. The United States could be forced to intervene, and arguably justified in doing so, in order to protect its own interests.
Quebec independence in and of itself would be unlikely to trigger American intervention. The risk rests in Canadian and American perceptions of Quebec's ability to function as a North American partner. The burden of proof would lie with Quebec, and its Achilles' Heel in this test would be its nationalism, the very thing which motivated its drive for independence. American disenchantment with Cuba, for example, runs far deeper than the ideological confrontation between capitalism and socialism. It springs from the unpredictability of a strongly nationalistic entity which challenges an American sphere of interest.
In the geopolitics of an independent Quebec, nationalism would be a given, from all quarters most directly involved -- Quebec, Canada, the U.S., and France. Therefore, the issue of greatest import is the prevention of radical nationalism, which is a programme best begun prior to any separation at all. For this reason, the Canadian government's recent hardline stance is as ironic as it is dangerous. It has "clarified" nothing, and amounts to radicalization from the one player in the equation which stands to gain the most from continuing moderation. If Quebecois culture and nationalism were so easily cowed, separatism would not be an issue almost two hundred and fifty years after the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. By challenging separatism with intimidation rather than reason, federalists are openly surrendering the idea of national dialogue and needlessly provoking a Quebecois radicalism which eventually could have serious repercussions for major players in the North Atlantic community.
Dee Sparling, August 2000.
UPDATE JANUARY 2001: As of January 2001 Quebec separatism has become a hot issue once again, with PQ leadership candidate Bernard Landry making derogatory comments about the Canadian flag and suggesting that the Quebec National Assembly alone will decide the legitimacy of referendum questions and results, regardless of the federal government's perspective and the Supreme Court's ruling.
UPDATE MARCH 2001: The Globe and Mail (March 23rd) reports on Parti Quebecois leader Bernard Landry's inaugural speech at the Quebec "National Assembly", citing his comment that, "History has interlaced the destinies of Quebec and Canada. In denying the historic spirit of these ties, the federal government has tried through the clarity act to deprive Quebec of the possibility of envisaging a relationship with Canada founded on another type of association than the one that currently exists."
