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SepSecIntelligence
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SECOND-GUESSING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR:
A Reassessment of Revisionism and Repressibility
CHAPTER FOUR
James G. Randall: Fort Sumter Reassaulted
Copyright © 1995 Dee Sparling
Using the theoretical foundation supplied by Ramsdell and Craven, James G. Randall focused on events traditionally portrayed as evidence that Southern aggression precipitated war. He viewed the crises of secession and Fort Sumter not so much as immediate causes of the war, but the unsurprising effects of political agitation and "blundering" leadership. 1 For those who would dismiss this subtle distinction as causal wizardry, Randall's self-defense is straightforward:
The Sumter affair was not a cause, but an incident result ing from pre-existing governmental deadlock; Sumter requires explanation, and that explanation carries one back into all the other alleged factors.2What distinguishes Randall's position from the chain-reaction flavour of slavery-culturalism is his view that the "other alleged factors" were themselves "repressible." Like Ramsdell and Craven, he feels the contemporary misrepresentation of events and circumstances created, rather than reflected, sectional alienation.3 Thus he sifts through the smoke and fireworks of Charleston Harbour in search of what might be deemed a deeper accountability.
This linkage of the bombardment with political problems in the 1850s ensures that total responsibility for the ensuing war is not conveniently thrust upon Southern shoulders for circumstantial reasons. For example, the position implicitly rejects Lincoln's "I would save the Union"4 charade as absurdly ironic coming from the author of the uncompromising "House Divided" speech. However, Southern leaders are not absolved of accountability either. A strong case could be made that nonslaveholders were dragged into secession against their popular will.5 And certainly Randall objects to monolithic portrayals of either section,6 asserting that
given certain conditions of forced leadership and suppressed thought, the oneness of executive action in a nation may in fact represent nothing at all in terms of consolidated will and intent distilled from the whole mass.7
Randall's point is well-taken, for even the call to secede had been decried by many Southerners prior to Sumter. And dissension was not confined to the Border States, as commonly assumed. Concerns were voiced as far south as Louisiana even after that state had seceded. By the same token many Northerners resisted a "war attitude" even after the Charleston incident. A perusal of editorials proves not only that such "dissent" existed on both sides, but that it was a publicized element of national political culture.
In late March of 1860, long before Lincoln's election, The Republican Banner in Nashville warned that
it is time the people of both the North and South should look at this subject without their party glasses--with a naked, patriotic eye. They will then see two parties occupying the front ground, the cohesive element of which, as far as ideas are concerned, is a sectional question. They will see that without this sectional cement both parties would disintegrate and become powerless. They will see the principal ingredient in this patent political glue is their own sectional prejudices, upon which they have permitted the political tricksters of the day to draw ad libitum. They will see they have been drawn into an unnecessary and unholy contest . . . .8
In May the New Orleans Daily True Delta condemned the plots of Fire Eaters who were using the presidential election campaign to resurrect the decades-old spectre of secession:
Do such men imagine the people to be insane, that they will follow their lead; or so steeped in corruption that they will listlessly witness the destruction of their government and dismemberment of their glorious Union under such dictation?9
In July The North Carolina Standard cautioned against rushing into a "vortex" of disunion, noting the benefits--past, present, and future-- of loyalty to the Republic.10 With telling sobriety, it reassured its readers of the State's security under the Constitution:
No menace even is uttered against her, save by the more radical portion of the black Republicans. The national Democrats of the non-slaveholding States have defended and are defending her rights as a slaveholding State both in Congress and before their fellow-citizens. . . . In a word, no reason exists why North Carolina should contemplate at this time a dissolution of the Union.11
These newspapers continued to act as beacons of moderation well into 1861, despite Lincoln's election and the secession of the Lower South. In January of that year The Republican Banner advocated continuing loyalty and concern for the Union:
There are a few, even in Tennessee, who sympathize with these disunionists per se, but they are very few, and thus far have been very modest in the avowal of such sentiments. Tennessee is emphatically a Union State, if the Union can be preserved upon terms of equality and justice, and is for making an attempt to preserve it before abandoning the hope.12More striking was the Daily True Delta's continued rejection of disunion nearly a month after Louisiana's exit had turned from prospect to fact.13 After a long-winded celebration of the late "American Union," it concluded with an implicit call for its restoration:
Once more, and finally, we implore our brethren north and south, particularly those men in power in both sections contrary to the well understood preferences of a majority of the people, to reflect well and duly weigh the terrible responsibility they will incur who destroy this form of government and array its children in irreconcilable antagonism to each other.14And finally, The North Carolina Standard reaffirmed its faith in the Union even while expressing concern over the ultimate intentions of the Republican executive:
We will never submit to the administration of the government on the principles of that party so far as they relate to slavery in the Territories; but while we say this for the hundredth time, we also hold that justice should be done even to Mr. Lincoln and his party, and that he who would deliberately fan the flame of sectional strife, instead of doing all he can to put out the fires of discord which threaten to consume the temple of the Union, is guilty of an inexpiable crime.15
These editorials are not proof of widespread dissent from seces sionism. But they provide evidence that alternative perspectives were voiced in such important centres as Nashville, New Orleans, and Raleigh. Moreover these sentiments survived both Lincoln's election and the secession of the Lower South, which must indicate some substantial degree of popular appeal. The full extent of this is difficult to gauge in the wake of secessionist victories, though Barney notes that voter turnout rates for the presidential and secession elections respectively declined from 70 to 49 percent in the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.16 He suggests that intimidation and a sense of inevitability resulted in informal boycotts,17 which leaves historians little room to draw definitive conclusions regarding Southern solidarity.
What is clear is that something changed with the Sumter affair and Lincoln's subsequent call for troops. Nashville's usually conciliatory Republican Banner suddenly became vitriolic, declaring that "to all intents and purposes we are severed from the Black Republican Government."18 With a sentiment reminiscent of 1776, it rationalized this posture in terms familiar to all Americans:
As long as the honor, interests, happiness and prosperity of a free people are consulted, and their constitutional rights secured in the administration of the government, so long will that government exist, harmoniously, and the minority cheerfully submit to the majority. But right or no right of secession, no government can long be maintained which utterly and flagrantly disregards these important and indispensable requisites of permanency and security.19
Lincoln's decision to force the issue at Sumter had been a political gamble ventured against the advice of his military advisors.20 In fact risking war ran contrary to the feelings of many Northerners, a position confirmed by editorials calling for peace to counter those rallying for war. Mere days after the bombardment supposedly had decided the "inevitability" of war, moderate voices were still being heard through such publications as The Providence Evening Press, which declared its judgment of war fever as an "accursed infirmity of human nature."21 It warned that
on the Southern plains, it is stimulating its subjects to vie with each other in their zeal to shed first blood of their Northern brethren, and among the hills of the North it is instigating cooler temperaments to thirst for the fratricidal onset.22On April 15th The Eastern Argus of Portland, Maine, declared the Sumter affair "an egregious mistake" on Lincoln's part, and committed "against the advice of General Scott."23 It complained that
. . . the ultra war Republicans, having the power, would not allow the people to be consulted and their verdict to be taken. An equal majority of the people, we think, were in favor of a peaceful separation, if a separation must come.24Trenton's Daily True American published an article that same day surmising how
the possession of Fort Sumter by either party, with the force which it recently contained, could do no positive good nor harm to either party, and the status quo might well have been maintained if there had existed any urgent desire for peace on either side.25
But it was the words of Pennsylvania's Lancaster Intelligencer that rang almost prophetically. In an item condemning "false and exaggerated statements" that were crippling objectivity in the contemplation of war, it advised citizens "to look the dangers squarely in the face."26 Wisely and fearfully anticipating what some historians have since dubbed "the first modern war," the article made the following prediction:
Both armies in their general character, ability and courage are worthy of the American name, and in anything but a fratricidal war might challenge the admiration of the world for the qualities they possess to make efficient soldiers. Terrible will be the result when they meet in a general conflict, for both sides will lack no spirit that will tend to make them victorious.27It went on to predict a long, horrific war of great cost to both sides, whatever the outcome.
As with the Southern editorials, the Northern counterparts prove that anti-war sentiment existed but confirm nothing of its scope. Yet its presence should scarcely be surprising considering that Lincoln swayed only 54 percent of the ballots among free-state voters in 1860,28 hardly a landslide mandate. If nearly half were unsure of his intentions before the election, it is reasonable to suggest many were even less well-disposed as he brought the nation to the brink of war. There is no sound reason for dismissing the flavour of the items above as exceptional rather than reflecting strong undercurrents of opinion.
Randall's arguments for repressibility reveal an obvious scepticism for viewing war itself as a barometer of collective will:
The obtaining of soldiers is not a matter of persuasion as to issues. War participation is not proof of war attitude.29He also rejects the deterministic notion that war has been necessary for clearing away the cobwebs of human history, asking, "Why do adventitious things, or glaringly abnormal things, have to be elementally or cosmically accounted for?"30 In essence, war is never destined; it is decided upon either purposefully or through negligent action. This could be explained in terms of one or several persons, on one or both sides of a dilemma, acting in a spirit of emotionalism and irrational ity. True, these are innately human tendencies. But so too are self-control and rationality.
Thomas J. Pressly has criticized Randall, and Revisionists in general, for equating "reality" and "rationality" with "peace."31 To him the school comprises "disappointed idealists" unable to forgive the Civil War generation for failing to resolve "difficult and complex problems."32 Revisionists apparently do not appreciate "the possibility that `rational' and `realistic' individuals might choose war in some situations as a last resort and as the lesser of evils."33
But Pressly also can be challenged. This study contends that "rational" and "realistic" options for peace and moderation were proposed throughout the various crises of the 1850s, only to be ignored or ridiculed by a host of influential personalities, one of whom later claimed his paramount desire was to "save the Union." Each pass ing crisis called for a choice between agitation and reconciliation on the part of leaders North and South. Secession and the Fort Sumter affair were no different in this respect, except that by 1861 the political stakes had been raised so high that further agitation increasingly meant risking war instead of merely bruising egos. However, a conciliatory path remained tangible, justifiable, and to many preferable, at each step along the way. But time and again this viewpoint was ignored.
Further, Pressly's reference to rational individuals who "might choose war" is of doubtful relevance to Civil War causation. Certainly Randall never claims the "blundering generation" consciously chose war. Again, a distinction must be drawn between a definite decision for war and a willingness to risk war unnecessarily. Self-interested leaders in the North and South are charged with increasing the likelihood of war by obstructing the potential for peaceful resolution. That secession itself did not spark immediate military confrontation is a strong reason for relieving even Lincoln from extreme charges that he actually chose war! What "blundering" leaders did choose, however, was to provoke an atmosphere conducive to a "needless war."
Finally, it is doubtful whether Lincoln and official Republican policy were clear as to which was the "lesser of evils," slavery or war. As previously suggested, the "ultimate extinction" principle was as morally ambiguous as "popular sovereignty." The latter at least theoretically allowed for the absolute exclusion of slavery wherever popular will was consulted. "Ultimate extinction" guaranteed indefinitely its existence in the South. If Republicans considered slavery per se the greater evil, openly prefering war to its toleration, why would they have advocated even this limited compromise? Hence the real question is whether slavery's expansion into the territories was a greater evil than war. And as demonstrated, an affirmative answer is irrelevant; the alleged "expansion" was heavily exaggerated, and for political expediency as much as ethical resolve. Thus whatever merit is allowed Pressly's contention that rational individuals may choose war as the lesser of evils, the logic does not necessarily apply in this context.
Randall's contribution to the general interpretation is one of emphasis. It has been shown that Charles Ramsdell's position rests on statistical evidence that slavery was indeed little more than an abstract issue in the territories. Avery Craven's condemnation of emotionalism and agitation also seems well-grounded and justifies a rethinking of the Lincoln legend, a vindication of moderates like Stephen Douglas, and by consequence a serious look at Ramsdell's proposal as more than just a hindsight theory of no pertinence to the contemporary debate. The Randall position highlights the relevance of these themes right through to decisions that resulted in secession and Fort Sumter.
Immediate circumstances leading to open warfare must not be separated from their political origins in the 1850s or viewed as evidence of universally shared intent. To do so reduces the causation equation to rather deterministic notions like "Southern belligerence," "Northern solidarity," and "national destiny" at the expense of accountability and a recognition that lessons could be learned about burning bridges.
Notes
1. James G. Randall, "The Blundering Generation," M.V.H.R., 27 (June 1940): 3-28. See an abridged version in Rozwenc, pp. 165-176.
2. Randall, in Rozwenc, p. 175.
3. Ibid., pp. 165-176.
4. In a letter to Horace Greeley, dated August 22, 1862, Lincoln stated his war aim was "to save the Union," preferring to blur his stance on emancipation by employing his trademark semantic style. Stampp, The Causes Of The Civil War, pp. 150-151.
5. Randall suggests many Southerners that were Unionist at heart were persuaded to support secession in the belief that it would be a short-term gesture of warning to the North, a kind of political leveraging. Randall, in Rozwenc, p. 173. Barney proposes that the process of secession was only pseudo-democratic, involving intimida tion mixed with a general sense among rank-and-file Southerners that an affirmative result at the ballot box was essentially a foregone conclusion. This, he feels, largely explains low turnout rates among eligible voters. See Barney p. 209.
6. Randall, in Rozwenc, pp. 173-174.
7. Ibid., pp. 171-172.
8. "The Position Of The Southern Opposition," The Republican Banner, Nashville, March 29, 1860. See Dwight Lowell Dumond (Editor), Southern Editorials On Secession (New York: The Century Company, 1931), pp. 63-64.
9. "The True Issue," The Daily True Delta, New Orleans, May 10, 1860, in Dumond, p. 89.
10. "A Constitutional Union," The North Carolina Standard, Raleigh, July 11, 1860, in Dumond, p. 143.
11. Ibid.
12. "The Crittenden Compromise," Republican Banner, January 25, 1861, in Dumond, p. 414.
13. Louisiana seceded January 26, 1861.
14. "A Dangerous Mistake," The Daily True Delta, February 15, 1861, in Dumond, pp. 459-460.
15. "Mr. Lincoln's Inaugural," The North Carolina Standard, March 9, 1861, in Dumond, pp. 476-477.
16. Barney, p. 209.
17. Ibid.
18. "Action Of The Legislature--Action Of The People," Republican Banner, May 9, 1861, in Dumond, p. 515.
19. Ibid., p. 516.
20. Barney, p. 211.
21. "The Spirit Of War," Providence Evening Press, Providence, Rhode Island, April 11, 1861, in Perkins, Northern Editorials On Secession 2, p. 1063.
22. Ibid.
23. "President Lincoln's War," Eastern Argus, Portland, Maine, April 15, 1861, in Perkins, 2, p. 767.
24. Ibid.
25. "The War Commenced--Where Is It To End," Trenton Daily True American, Trenton, New Jersey, April 15, 1861, in Perkins, 2, p. 769.
26. "False And Exaggerated Statements," Lancaster Intelligencer, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, May 21, 1861, in Perkins, 2, p. 1056.
27. "False And Exaggerated Statements," Lancaster Intelligencer, in Perkins, 2, p. 1056.
28. Barney, see chart on page 190.
29. Randall, in Rozwenc, p. 173.
30. Ibid., p. 175.
31. Pressly, p. 308.
32. Ibid., p. 336.
33. Ibid., p. 308.
